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Abstract
The KM3NeT Collaboration runs a multi-site neutrino observatory in the
Mediterranean Sea. Water Cherenkov particle detectors, deep in the sea
and far off the coasts of France and Italy, are already taking data while
incremental construction progresses. Data Acquisition Control software is
operating off-shore detectors as well as testing and qualification stations for
their components. The software, named Control Unit, is highly modular.
It can undergo upgrades and reconfiguration with the acquisition running.
Interplay with the central database of the Collaboration is obtained in a way
that allows for data taking even if Internet links fail. In order to simplify
the management of computing resources in the long term, and to cope with
possible hardware failures of one or more computers, the KM3NeT Control
Unit software features a custom dynamic resource provisioning and failover
technology, which is especially important for ensuring continuity in case of
rare transient events in multi-messenger astronomy. The software architec-
ture relies on ubiquitous tools and broadly adopted technologies and has been
successfully tested on several operating systems.
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1. Introduction
The KM3NeT neutrino detectors are complex objects [1] designed for
neutrino astrophysics [2] and the study of atmospheric neutrino oscillations
[3]. They are being built an the bottom of the Mediterranean Sea in a
phased installation scheme. The infrastructure will consist consist of three-
dimensional arrays of photosensors also called building blocks. Each build-
ing block will comprise 115 vertical instrumented detection lines (Detection
Unit, DU) equipped with 18 optical sensors (Digital Optical Module, DOM).
Each DOM [4] contains 31 photo-multiplier tubes (PMTs) that detect the
Cherenkov light induced by relativistic particles emerging from neutrino in-
teractions. The French site will host one such building block (Oscillation
Research with Cosmics in the Abyss - ORCA) and the Italian site will host
two building blocks (Astroparticle Research with Cosmics in the Abyss -
ARCA). In each DOM, the data recorded by the PMTs are digitised and
transferred to the shore station by the Central Logic Board (CLB). The
settings and performance of PMTs need to be controlled and monitored.
Prototype DOM [5] and DU [6] have been successfully operated in the sea
before deploying and running detection units according to the final design.
The DOMs host also other instruments devoted to monitoring and dynamic
position reconstruction, as the detector shape in water currents is constantly
changing. In particular, an acoustic positioning system is in place taking
data from hydrophones that listen to known emitters. At the base of each
DU there is a module that contains some instruments and a CLB. The Trig-
ger and Data Acquisition System (TriDAS) [7] relies on a distributed and
scalable architecture. The computing processes that implement the TriDAS
have a number of running instances that may grow as needed, exceeding a
few hundreds on tens of servers in a single installation. Each detector can run
different tasks, with varying data taking strategies. The Control Unit (CU),
a suite of computer processes exposing distributed services, has the task of
directing all such hardware and software components to work together. The
Control Unit is also in charge of collecting and storing logs of operations that
are suitable both for machine processing and human access.
In addition to the above stated needs, the qualification and certification
procedures for single PMTs, DOMs or whole DUs require running one or
more data acquisition tasks in controlled environments and with multiple
testing protocols [8] to ensure that all devices operate within specifications.
The software running in detector operation is also used for production and
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testing of components. Test bench stations [9] actually work in a way that
is very similar to shore stations of detectors for physics data taking.
KM3NeT searches for rare events - interactions both of primary cosmic
neutrinos and of secondary neutrinos from cosmic rays - that may occur at
any time. Maximising the detector livetime is a key requirement to collect
high statistics. Hence the reliability of the Control Unit and the possibility
to operate continuously despite hardware or software failures have a direct
impact on the statistical significance of data taking results.
The detectors are designed to operate at least for 10 years in the sea. The
software makes use of widely adopted standards (see ahead in the text) at
its foundation, with a large development and user base that should ensure
support for a long time scale. All custom code is completely under the
control of the KM3NeT Collaboration, whose software quality plan includes
long-term software preservation.
After an overview in Section 2 of the distributed architecture, the present
paper describes the various services it consists of. Authentication and iden-
tification of users and services are described in Section 3. Run control and
overall supervision are described in Section 4. Details about the represen-
tation of detectors and operational parameters in the database are given in
Section 5. Interaction with the database is described in Section 6. Control
of detector devices and instruments is described in Section 7. In Section 8 it
is shown how the software components of the data processing chain are con-
trolled. Details of the networking protocols and services are given in Section
9. Dynamic resource provisioning and fault tolerance are described in Sec-
tion 10. Conclusions are given in Section 11. For convenience, all acronyms
are listed in the Appendix.
2. Software components
The Control Unit consists of five different services that can run indepen-
dently of each other:
1. Local Authentication Provider (LAP);
2. Master Control Program (MCP);
3. Database Interface (DBI);
4. Detector Manager (DM);
6
5. TriDAS Manager (TM).
The services can run on the same machine or on different servers, in the
case of installations with failover functions. All programs are written in C#,
as specified in the standards ECMA-334:2003-2006, ISO/IEC 23270:2003-
2006 and following. The executables are encoded in a machine-independent
language that are JIT-compiled by the Mono 1 compiler and can then run
on different operating systems such as flavours of GNU/Linux 2, Microsoft
Windows 3 and OS X. In the KM3NeT context, the Control Unit is hosted
by servers running CentOS 7 or SLC6.
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Figure 1: The Control Unit components and their relationships. White and black arrows
represent flows of control and monitoring information. Red arrows show the flow of au-
thentication / authorization information. The flow of PMT and acoustic data from the
detector to the TriDAS and hence to the final storage is not shown.
1 https://www.mono-project.com
2 The distributions tested include Fedora 24, SLC6, CentOS 7, Debian 8 “Jessie”,
Debian 9 “Stretch”, LMDE 2, Linux Mint 19 and Ubuntu 16.04 LTS, but there are no
evident reasons for incompatibility on others.
3 Windows 7 / 2008 or higher, all desktop and server versions.
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All services have been developed to have a small footprint in terms of
CPU and memory usage. They may run in more than one process on differ-
ent machines for failover purposes (see Sect. 10) or to meet high demands
in terms of workload. The latter case is foreseen for DM controlling large
detectors, e.g. the full ARCA installation with a total such as 230 DUs.
Each service has a unique access point through HTTP 4. The Graphical
User Interface (GUI), when present, is offered as a Web-like service on the
HTTP. The GUI can be accessed by HTTP on VPN (Virtual Private Net-
work) from remote controllers that pass both VPN authentication and CU
authentication (see Sect. 3). For highly critical management purposes and
basic configuration, a local console accessible only by administrators through
terminal is provided. The risk of misconfiguration is assessed to be higher
if coming from inexperienced users than from remote attackers. Figure 1
shows the logical connections among the services and with the detector and
TriDAS components. In addition to control and logging, the Control Unit is
also the bridge between the users, the central KM3NeT database [10], and
the off-shore detector and the online trigger system.
3. Authentication and identification - LAP
Access to detector control and management is given to users on the basis
of an authentication system, which is managed by the Local Authentication
Provider. The LAP uses accounts and session tokens to manage identification
and authentication. All accounts are kept in an encrypted local file together
with the security credentials and privileges. When a login request is accepted
for an account, the corresponding privileges are copied to a new session token
that is then kept active until it expires or is deleted because of an explicit
logout. The LAP uses the logical scheme of account management shown in
Table 1.
Operating privileges are given to user and service accounts to enable
specific functions such as controlling the whole station in terms of jobs (high
level) or tuning single parameters (low level). It is worth noticing that the
function of a service depends on its privileges rather than on its name. This
allows flexibility in the design: in the future, a single process may incorporate
more than one function and this would just need a change in the registration
4Secure communication on SSL / TLS could also be supported, but in a local private
network of the KM3NeT ICT infrastructure this is overkill.
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User account
Local account The unique identifier, name and password
are created locally in the detector / test
bench control station and are meaningless
outside of it
Global account The unique identifier, name and password
are managed on the central database of
KM3NeT and are periodically synchro-
nized with a local encrypted cache
Service account Defines a common name for a CU service
Table 1: Account types.
on the LAP rather than statically hard-coding an association between a name
and a function.
A user can be granted privileges one by one or in well-defined groups
named roles. Because detectors take data 365 days a year, 24 hours a day,
the KM3NeT Collaboration follows a shift plan to share the load of detector
control. Each shift lasts seven days and a shift team includes a Shifter and a
Shift Leader, with the tasks of monitoring the detector operation and checking
data quality. The Run Coordinator stays in charge for a longer timespan
(usually four-eight weeks), connecting the activity of each shift team to the
next and overseeing the optimisation of the detector performance. The role
system is especially useful for shift management: when a user is registered
on the central database for a shift, he / she gets automatically and for the
corresponding time window all the privileges that are defined in the Shifter
/ Shift Leader / Run Coordinator role. They are all revoked when the shift
ends. A user that is registered as a DAQ Expert (Data AcQuisition expert,
usually among the lead developers of hardware or software components) or
Detector Operation Manager (responsible for detector management, usually
for several years) on the central database automatically gets all the related
privileges on all installations. For example, shifters are supposed to operate
the detectors using predefined configurations, whereas experts are allowed to
tune single parameters for diagnostic and testing purposes.
While the concept of a user login is quite intuitive, a service login deserves
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some explanation. The mere fact that a program is installed and running
on a server is not enough for it to be known to the LAP (and hence to
other CU services). When the program logs in on the LAP it gets its own
security token and becomes known to all other CU services. This explicit
login requirement ensures that the hardware resource usage can be optimised
and services can be moved from one machine to another according to the
needs. This also makes the initial configuration easier, because there is no
need to handcraft a static configuration file. Administrators can build the
configuration indirectly by issuing incremental commands to the LAPs to
register new instances of services.
4. Run control - MCP
The Master Control Program is in charge of maintaining the run status
of the detector and TriDAS. The complete information of the run status
consists of the following pieces:
1. Current detector: a detector changes when DUs are added or removed
or for a failover reconfiguration (see Sect. 10).
2. Current runsetup: the coherent set of input parameter values control-
ling the detector, such as PMT supply voltage, and quantities to be
read out for logging. See Sect. 7 and 8 for more details.
3. Current run number: a run is a timespan during which a detector is
operated with the same runsetup; for practical reasons a long run may
be split in two or more with the same runsetup to have smaller output
datafiles.
4. Current target: the overall target of the CU can be one of the following
(notice that a target change does not imply a run switch):
• Off: all PMTs are turned off, data taking is off, no triggering or
post-processing.
• On: all PMTs are on, data taking is off, no triggering or post-
processing.
• Run: all PMTs are on, data taking is active, triggering and post-
processing run.
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5. Current time / position calibration: the set of adjusted positions and
time offsets for individual PMTs that is being used for online triggering.
6. Current job: a job is a run schedule with a priority grade. A run
may start with or without a predefined schedule because the MCP
may be commanded to immediately switch the run number. A job is
a promise that at some time a new run will start with a runsetup that
is defined in advance and that will last for a certain timespan, unless
preempted by higher priority jobs. One job may correspond to one or
more runs. Some examples on job management are shown in Figure 2:
the baseline job is usually defined to use a runsetup with tuned PMT
voltages and the detector in “On” state; jobs J1-J8 might be routine
data taking jobs with priority 1 and the detector in Run state; job J9
might be a calibration run and job J10 might be running a special data
taking. Routine jobs J6 and J7 will produce no runs because they will
be overridden by J10. J3 will produce two runs because the MCP will
start with it, switch to J9 after J3 has started and then fall back to J3
again when J9 ends.
Baseline job
J1 J2 J3 J4 J5 J6 J7 J8
J10J9
time
0
pr
io
rit
y
1
2
run number
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Figure 2: Example of job chart. See explanations in the text.
Jobs may be modified before they begin and they can be truncated when
they have started. The run status, run switch history and job addition /
deletion / modification history are kept in a dedicated local file, which acts
as a transaction log. Such information is periodically pulled by the DBI to
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be recorded in the central database 5. Only after the information has been
successfully written in the database, the file is purged. In addition, all run
switches are recorded to a human-readable log file, but the syntax is such
that, in case of loss or corruption of the run status file, it is possible to
reconstruct the latter from the former.
In standard operation, a detector may be required to run for months with
the same operating parameters. For this purpose, it is possible to use the
“auto-schedule” feature that automatically fills a priority line with jobs of
equal duration and a specified runsetup and target. This frees shifters from
error-prone repetitive tasks.
Whenever the run state changes, the MCP notifies all the services that
are registered in the LAP with the Status Notification Privilege) privilege,
which usually means at least DM and TM. This is a “push” type notifica-
tion, aimed at fast communication. Fault tolerance is ensured by the “pull”
communication mode: the DM and TM periodically update their knowledge
of the run state by retrieving such information from the MCP. A finite time
will elapse between the run switch by the MCP and the reaction in the DM
and TM. All this is logged and it is possible to precisely identify the run
switch latency time in each case.
A run switch is also triggered by a system reconfiguration after a fault
(more detail in Sect. 10). It is worth pointing out that the MCP alone is
responsible for providing a unique pair of detector and run number for each
run. Different detectors in different KM3NeT sites can use the same run
number without clashes.
The MCP offers a Web-based GUI (Figure 3) to perform all routine tasks,
with the exception of service configuration and disaster recovery. The GUI
enforces user privilege compliance: job scheduling is not allowed to users
that are neither on shift nor DAQ Expert privilege owners. An additional
security check layer involving LAP queries is able to filter out possible HTTP
forged queries that may try to circumvent or bypass the GUI. In this context,
HTTPS would be possible but overkill because security is focused on ensuring
compliance, by users and automated processes, to data taking procedures.
All communications already occur on a private network and users connect
through a VPN.
5 Remotely hosted in the computing centre CC-IN2P3 in Lyon - https://cc.in2p3.fr.
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Figure 3: Screenshot of the MCP graphical user interface, with several jobs scheduled at
different priorities.
5. Detector description and runsetups
5.1. Detectors
KM3NeT detectors are described and defined in the central database. A
detector always has a location and a start timestamp, which is the first time
it is connected and can provide signals. The end timestamp is set on its
final disconnection. The same physical detector, located in the same place
and reconnected, would have a different detector identifier. From the point
of view of the CU, a detector is a list of previously integrated DUs and
TriDAS processes, namely Data Queues (DQs) to rearrange data packets
from single DOMs into events, Optical / Acoustic Data Filters (ODFs /
ADFs) to run triggering algorithms and Data Writers (DWs) to write data
to disk. In a basic implementation, TriDAS processes are defined in the
central database, the process map is static and there can be no failover plan.
In a more evolved view that supports dynamic provisioning and failover, the
set of TriDAS processes might change during the lifetime of a detector and
even several times per day in case of failures or addition of computing power.
Nevertheless, from the point of view of MCP, DM and TM, there is only
one definition of a detector that is provided at a certain time, and it always
includes TriDAS processes.
13
5.2. Runsetups
PMTs need their operating high voltage (HV) to be fine-tuned in order
to provide uniform performance. The optimal value might also change over
time. Likewise, functions may need to be enabled or disabled on certain
DOMs, especially for testing and calibration purposes. Runsetups define the
input to each DOM and the output for feedback, monitoring and data logging,
and all of them depend on the purpose each runsetup was defined for (e.g.
minimum data filtering, timing tuning, HV tuning, etc.). Many runsetups
differ only for some sets of parameters. Parameters with correlated meanings
and purposes (e.g. PMT HVs, threshold and activation state) coalesce into
configuration groups. Each runsetup is an ordered list of configuration groups,
which are picked at various levels as referring to a whole category of items,
subcategory or individual items.
6. Interaction with the database - DBI
The service named Database Interface (DBI) is devoted to handling the
interaction with the central database. Its main operating principle is to
work as a file buffer to replace SQL / DML interaction of programs with the
database as sketched in Figure 4. The main reasons to implement a DBI are:
• To avoid redundancy, database access credentials are stored in a single
place at CU installation time and encrypted for safety.
• Decoupling CU code and database code / schema. SQL queries and /
or DML statements need not be written in any code outside of the DBI
itself. All the complications of handling and converting database data
types are handled by the DBI and the client code is written in terms
of CU data structures. This allows for refactoring on either side, i.e.
the necessary evolution over time of both the CU and database will not
affect each other.
• Coping with remote connection instability. The connection with the
central database uses a Wide Area Network, which is intrinsically un-
reliable. The DBI stores all the datasets that are needed for CU op-
eration in a local cache, speeding up access and improving reliability.
On the other hand, the DBI buffers write operations and replays them
if they fail because the database is not accessible.
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Figure 4: Logic and network protocols involved in data download from the database. (a)
Detector data flow. (b) Runsetup data flow. (c) Calibration data flow.
Information sets that have been downloaded from the database are hosted
in the download cache in XML format. As shown in Figure 4, they include:
• The current detector definition. It is downloaded only when the detec-
tor definition changes, by authorized users.
• All runsetups written for the current detector (a one-to-many relation-
ship). The DBI regularly polls the database for appearance of new
runsetups, but on-demand access is tried for runsetups required by the
MCP / DM / TM that are not yet in the cache.
• The current sets of calibration data. These data are continuously polled
for updated versions and immediately pushed to the MCP and other
services.
While runsetups are usually created by humans and the time of their
creation is well separated from the time they are used, calibration datasets
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are supposed to be updated regularly and automatically to have optimal
detector operation. As soon as a new set is available and has been successfully
downloaded, the DBI notifies the MCP which decides when to switch the run
and broadcasts the signal to other services. In this sense, the DBI is an active
part in data taking.
The upload cache stores data queued to be written in the database, usu-
ally flushed upon successful transfer. In this case, binary files are expected
in the native format generated by writer programs. The DBI handles the
needed conversions. At present, the following types of data are hosted in the
upload cache:
• DM datalogs that contain detector monitoring data and notification of
management events, such as the real time of run start for each CLB,
which is different from the time the MCP issues the command to change
the run number; see Sect. 7 for more details.
• TM datalogs containing logs of TriDAS activity, documenting actual
starting-stop times of each run process-by-process, possible crashes,
etc.; see Sect. 8 for more details.
• Times-Of-Arrival (TOAs) of acoustic wave pulses found by the ADF(s).
Run book-keeping information is “pulled” by the DBI querying the MCP
and written to the database without going through a local cache. This reflects
the fact that datalog and TOA tables in the database have foreign keys to the
table of runs: an error in datalogs or TOAs remains confined to that dataset,
but an error in run book-keeping would have a cascade effect of errors on
other tables. The DBI will send a “purge” command to the MCP for runs
and jobs that have been successfully written. Datalogs and TOAs for the
runs and jobs that have been already communicated to the database and
staged in the upload cache are cleared for writing to the database, whereas
all other data therein are kept standing by. Figure 5 shows the different
information flows.
When a datalog or TOA set write fails, it is not retried until another
write of datalog or TOA set succeeds. This copes with the case of Wide Area
Network failure: for a certain timespan all writes fail, but each dataset is
tried only once. As soon as the database can be reached again, all queued
writes are executed. If a dataset cannot be written multiple times (usually
the threshold is set to 5), it is flagged as “failed” and must be reviewed by a
DAQ expert.
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Figure 5: Logic and network protocols involved in data upload to the database. (a) Datalog
data flow. (b) TOA data flow. (c) Run and job book-keeping information flow.
7. Detector management - DM
Detector subsystems work according to the state machine depicted in Fig-
ure 6. The three states “Idle” (corresponding to the “Off” target), “Ready”
(corresponding to the “On” target) and “Running” (corresponding to the
“Run” target) are stable, in the sense that they are supposed to be kept
throughout the duration of a run job lasting several hours. The “Standby”
and “Pause” states are transitional. The DM drives the state machine of
each CLB issuing events that are transported over the network. The task of
the Detector Manager is threefold:
1. setting the input parameters of DOMs as specified in the current run-
setup;
2. driving the state machines of the CLBs according to the current target;
3. reading out and logging the output parameters of DOMs producing the
datalog files ready to be written to the database by the DBI (see Sect.
6).
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Figure 6: The state machine for the data acquisition as implemented in both the CU and
the CLBs: the states are boxed, while the events are paired to the dashed arrows that
indicate the related state transitions.
The DM is indeed the most critical component of the CU from the point
of view of scalability to the size of a 115-DU block and beyond. It receives
messages from all CLBs and sends messages to all CLBs, so it is expected to
have CPU and memory footprints that are linearly dependent on the overall
number of DOMs.
The DM is expected to receive all notifications from the MCP when the
run state changes. As mentioned above, even if the “push” mode misses a
beat or a communication error occurs, the DM regularly polls the MCP to
know the run state. In fact, this allows the DM to work even if the system
is being reconfigured while data acquisition goes on. Any run state change
will be logged so that it can be written to the database.
Every time the detector or the runsetup changes, the DM goes through
all DOMs to reconfigure them. This means working out the full list of input
parameters and their values and output parameters. Such list is customised
to the level of a single PMT. The DM communicates with the CLBs by means
of the Simple Retransmission Protocol (SRP - see Subsect. 9.4), a UDP
(User Datagram Protocol)-based protocol. It includes functions to set up and
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establish the link between the DM server and the CLBs. This is useful both
when the DM first starts up, when DUs are rebooted or when a CLB needs
to be restarted. One of the purposes of the DM is monitoring the activity
of the CLBs and regaining control of those that may stop communicating,
thus minimising the need for human interventions. SRP allows point-to-
point messages from DM to the CLBs and back, broadcast messages and
subscription-based data transmission, so that the DM asks once for the set
of parameters to be monitored and receives regular updates (1 Hz or 0.1
Hz) without the need for further polling. Each CLB exposes the following
subsystems:
• System (SYS)
• Network (NET)
• Optics (OPT, only for CLBs hosted in DOMs)
• Acoustics (ACS)
• Instrumentation (INS)
• Base (BSE, only for DU base modules)
Each subsystem is controlled independently of the others. However, ex-
cept during the short timespans of transitions, all subsystems should be in
the same state. The DM takes actions when it receives a new CLB status
report: it is compared to the currently expected state and, only if they are
not in agreement, a new event is generated so the state machine moves to
another state. Parameter setting is only allowed in the Configure event that
connects the Standby state to the Ready state. Hence, any change in param-
eters implies driving the CLB state machine to the Standby state, setting the
parameters and then putting the state machine in the state that is consistent
with the current target. In doing so, also the run number is compared to
the corresponding monitoring variable shown by the CLB. If they differ, the
DM directs the CLB to go through all the states needed, until the CLB run
number matches the current run number defined by the MCP.
For testing and troubleshooting, the DM also provides a manual mode
that is reserved to users that hold the Detector Control privilege (usually
Run Coordinators and DAQ experts). The manual mode can be activated
on single CLBs and allows operators to tweak every single parameter and
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to control the state machine issuing events manually via a GUI. When the
automatic control mode is restored, the CLB goes back to normal operation,
but newly set input parameters are not restored until the next run switch.
The ability to control parameters manually is useful to fix possibly critical
conditions while a new runsetup is being prepared and a new run is ready to
start.
For DU base modules, it is also possible to use the GUI to toggle the DU
power. This function is reserved to holders of Detector Control privilege.
Some parameters can be tuned only through the DM console command line,
as they may cause severe damage to the detector, such as overcurrent.
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Figure 7: Sketch of the threading structure of the DM. The HTTP thread pool is not
shown. The Control Thread sends messages to all CLB Controllers, which have no thread
of their own. Processing threads (2 in the sketch) power the CLB Controllers by sharing the
workload. SRP threads (3 in the sketch) read the messages found in two UDP socket buffers
and convert them into events for CLB Controllers. Large arrows show the communication
flow towards CLB Controllers. Small arrows show the sharing of CLB control workload
among processing threads.
As shown in Figure 7, the DM has one Control Thread to handle a serial
queue of external commands (mostly from the MCP, but also from shifters
20
and console commands by administrators). There is one CLB Controller per
CLB, but this does not have its own thread: the usage of computing re-
sources by the DM has to be carefully controlled. Although it is a naturally
multi-threaded application, the usage of thread pools is limited to the HTTP
interface. The allocation of memory and threads for SRP communications
and for CLB action processing is statically configured. It can be changed by
explicitly setting configuration parameters in the DM console, but it cannot
change during a run. The UDP receive-buffer size can be statically config-
ured. In case of oversubscription, i.e. when too many SRP messages arrive, a
fraction of them is automatically dropped. Monitoring messages are grouped
by type and source; in case of excess load on the processing thread, sub-
sampling occurs by dropping a suitable fraction of messages. Such loss of
information turns out as a decrease of the average sampling frequency of the
detector monitoring. The DM provides counters to diagnose the communi-
cation and computing load, so that DAQ experts can adjust the allocation
of resources. As a reference, sampling a DU at 1 Hz uses about 10% of one
typical CPU core. This implies that about 12 cores should be enough for
the monitoring of a whole block of 115 DUs. It has been shown that a sin-
gle socket with 64 KiB receive-buffer can monitor at least three DUs. The
number of sockets can be tuned according to the needs, allowing to scale to
a full detector of multiple blocks..
The same program for DM is used in the various KM3NeT environments
of detector control, such as shore stations, qualification test benches and de-
velopment installations. In some cases, specific actions that are normal in
other contexts may carry high risks because of peculiarities in legacy hard-
ware. The DM has a standard blacklist of such actions (mostly related to
power control functions) that need to be individually allowed. An additional
module, called “Authorization Block”, which is compiled to run on a well-
identified machine in a single geographic place, enables those actions that
are potentially dangerous. The Authorization Block makes sure that an ad-
ministrator has explicitly unlocked all permitted functions. A DM without
an Authorization Block or with a locked one would filter all actions in the
blacklist.
Two outputs are continuously generated by the DM: one is a human-
readable log and the other is a binary formatted datalog. The latter is pro-
duced at regular intervals (usually 10 minutes) or when it reaches a certain
size (32 MiB in memory). It contains a chunk of monitoring data ready for
database insertion. Usually it is written in the upload cache of the DBI (see
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Sect. 6). Subsampled snapshots are exposed in the Virtual Directory (see
Subsect. 9.3) that is available via the HTTP, mostly for GUI purposes. An
example of a screenshot of the GUI with live monitoring data is shown in
Figure 8). In addition, other programs may read them if needed.
Figure 8: Graphical user interface of the DM for one DU and one DOM (superimposed).
Live monitoring data obtained via HTTP are shown.
8. TriDAS management - TM
The TriDAS is a set of programs developed in compliance with the re-
quirements of the KM3NeT data taking and processing framework. In most
scenarios there is at least one Dispatcher, one or more Optoacoustic Data
Queues, one or more Optical Data Filters, one or more Acoustic Data Fil-
ters and one or more Data Writers. All the programs need to be driven in
a coordinated way, consistently with the current operational target. They
all feature a state machine that is identical to the one implemented in the
CLBs. As a general guideline, normally all TriDAS components should be in
the same state as a generic CLB. Like in the case of the DM, each TriDAS
element has its own TriDAS Element Controller. In practice, control and
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communication are so different for CLBs and TriDAS programs that there
are very few similarities in the inner structure of DM and TM. The inner
structure of TM is shown in Figure 9.
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Figure 9: Sketch of the threading structure of the TM. The TM Control Thread receives
commands from HTTP and from the console. The Control Thread powers the Element
Controllers while the Control Host interface ensures the I/O and the Heartbeat provides a
clock.
If a CLB suddenly stops responding data taking by the remaining ones
goes on unperturbed. In the case of a crash of a TriDAS program, bringing
it quickly up again is important to minimise data loss. A crashing ADF
is almost harmless if it comes back again within a few hours. An ODF
that suddenly disappears leads to a proportional loss (1/NODFs) in detector
livetime for the duration of the restart procedure. An Optoacoustic Data
Queue that crashes leads to total data loss until it is up and running again.
Of course, the Data Writer is also crucial because data need to be saved.
While the DM communicates with the CLBs directly one by one, TriDAS
processes use the Control Host protocol 6 to communicate through the Dis-
patcher. As a result, the TM receives a time-ordered stream of messages from
the TriDAS processes. This has some implications on the control process:
• The Dispatcher must be identified, contacted and a permanent TCP
6 Originally developed by R. Gurin and A.Maslennikov (CASPUR, 1995).
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(Transmission Control Protocol) connection with the TM has to be
established.
• The Dispatcher cannot be used to start processes (although it can be
used to stop them).
• While the stream is time-ordered, it is not time-aware, in the sense that
it does not produce timeouts like a point-to-point connection does. As a
result, a command that is not answered will not automatically produce
a timeout error.
A local agent (named TriDASManager Agent, or TM Agent) communi-
cates with the TM to receive the requests to start or stop programs and uses
the LAP to check that the requests are authorized. The TriDASManager
Agent has a security system for credentials that is integrated with the CU.
The internal TriDAS Element Controllers have a few more states in their
state machine to handle the cases of a program that is starting up, but not
responsive yet, or shutting down. A “Heartbeat” is introduced to measure
time at a central level that is then broadcast to TriDAS Element Controllers.
The TM is a very lightweight application, with a CPU workload that is
normally about 3 or 4% of a single core and only ramps up a bit during run
start. It also provides datalogs to document starting and stopping times and
working conditions for each process.
9. Networking
The CU uses several protocols for communication. This is the result of
matching diverse needs and complying with existing standards or practices.
9.1. HTTP-based access
All CU services use HTTP as a basic communication protocol. Each CU
service uses a lightweight Web-server library that allows exposing an HTTP
access. Notice that this is the opposite of what Web-hosting normally means,
i.e. hosting the application inside a Web-server. In this case, the application
has its own port and its own Web-server dedicated to it. As a matter of fact,
a service that runs as a daemon needs a way to communicate with machine
administrators, and this often goes through TCP. Using an HTTP interface
allows reducing the needs for ports, because both the administrative traffic
and user access can go through HTTP.
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When applicable, the HTTP server hosts conventional HTML pages for a
GUI. They are exposed in the /gui URL directory. Common image formats,
CSS style sheets, Javascript source files and AJAX are all supported.
9.2. SAWI remote calls
On top of the HTTP layer, the Server Application Web Interface (SAWI)
provides a lightweight implementation of remote procedure call. SAWI ex-
poses four virtual directories:
• /listmethods gets the list of callable methods;
• /call calls a method passing parameters;
• /callret gets the result of a long-running method call;
• /listcalls shows the list of calls and their completion status.
Subpages of these virtual directories are supposed to be called by pro-
grams and have no human-oriented formatting. The pages provided by de-
fault at the virtual directories instead show the available options: in practice,
a skilled user can mimic remote procedure calls and use the Web browser as
a debugger.
SAWI allows both blocking calls and asynchronous calls. The result of
an asynchronous call is stored as a job object that is remembered for a set
time (usually 10 minutes) after it ends. The caller is expected to poll the
/callret virtual directory for completion, specifying the process ID and the
ID of the call to get the result. The process ID is provided by the server: in
principle, a client has to account for a server process to be restarted, so the
call ID is not enough alone to uniquely identify a client-server call. If a server
process ID changes, the client knows that the result of the method call is lost
and there is no ambiguity. SAWI provides support only for simple datatypes
(Bool, Int, Long, Double, String). However, it transports exceptions from the
callee to the caller and distinguishes exceptions of the remote call protocol
from functional exceptions.
From the point of view of the developer, usage of SAWI is very simple:
the callee just has to flag the methods that have to be exposed with the
WSrvPage attribute. The C# method is reflected at runtime and exposed
over the network with the same parameter names. The caller has to include a
WSrvPageClient object that declares the name and the type of parameters.
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Available WebService pages - Process Instance 4785
Void NotifyTargetChange token,mode
String GetTarget token
Void Disable token,clb,subsystem
Void Enable token,clb,subsystem
Bool IsEnabled token,clb,subsystem
Void NotifyRunsetupChange token,runsetup,runnumber,runstartunixtime,t0set
Void NotifyRunnumberChange token,runnumber,runstartunixtime,t0set
String CurrentDetector token
String CurrentRunsetup token
Long CurrentRunNumber token
Void NotifyDetectorChange token,detector
Void NotifyTriDASOverrideChange token
Void NotifyOpticalDataTargetChange token
String GetAuthenticationManager token
Void Terminate token
Call method
Available WebService pages http://127.0.0.1:1302/listmethods/
Figure 10: SAWI steering page for method calls from a DM. Clicking on each
link would show a new page where the arguments to the call can be filled and
it can be started. Clients using SAWI would jump directly to subpages, e.g.
/call/Current Runsetup?token=aabbbccc (“aabbbccc” is meant to be the security to-
ken).
The first member of all CU calls is a token string that is checked with the
LAP to ensure that the caller has the right to call the procedure. Before
the call, the server and port have to be set. The WSrvPageClient object
can be used multiple times. Figure 10 shows an example screenshot of the
/listmethods steering page for a TriDASManager.
9.3. Virtual Directory
Each CU service exposes a /mon directory that is meant to contain real-
time monitoring data on the service application. They are organized in a
virtual directory tree that does not correspond to any file on disk. Leaves
in the tree are elementary data, i.e. JSON objects containing the data value
and the time it was set. Figure 11 shows an example of Virtual Directory
path to real-time monitoring on the DM.
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"value": -0.133000001311302 }
Figure 11: The KM3NeT detectors change their shape under the action of water currents.
The orientation and acceleration of the DOMs are constantly monitored. The example
shows the Virtual Directory path to /mon/clb/outparams/ahrs a/15/9/2 obtaining the
vertical acceleration value of the 9th DOM of the 15th DU.
The implementation of the Virtual Directory structure contains several
details that are relevant for optimised performance:
• each time a new leaf in the tree is created, the server gets a direct
reference to that leaf, which can then be updated without browsing the
full path, which would waste CPU power;
• HTTP clients are allowed to create shortcuts that gather a client-
defined set of variables in a single shot: subsequent calls to the short-
cut can retrieve unlimited groups of variables by direct access to their
leaves;
• writers access direct references to the data leaves in the tree, so they
do not need to traverse and lock the tree to repeatedly update values,
avoiding mutual locking with readers.
Virtual Directory data can be accessed both for the purpose of creating
GUI pages or to run monitoring scripts or applications. Using web clients
as well as ubiquitous executables such as wget or cURL it is possible to write
specific monitors.
9.4. Simple Retransmission Protocol
The UDP protocol on which the communication between DM and CLBs
is based is the SRP. It tags messages and tracks message acknowledgements
to allow re-transmission if needed. The DM uses a light version of the SRP
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library, written in C#, supporting the subset of the functions that are needed
for routine duty. Some diagnostic and debugging features would not be useful
in an automatic control context.
9.5. Control Host interface
The Control Host library, which is used as the inter-process communi-
cation protocol among the data triggering and processing applications, is
ported in C#. The Control Host protocol is used by the TM to connect
to the Dispatcher and read / write messages to components of the TriDAS.
Each message has a tag and is dispatched to all clients that subscribed for
that tag. Since each client can subscribe both for specific tags and for its own
unique identifier, both broadcast and one-to-one communication are possible.
The Dispatcher collects all incoming messages and enqueues them into serial
pipelines. One problem of this protocol is that it requires a persistent TCP
connection. Unlike SAWI, which is a connectionless protocol, the Control
Host protocol is built for high-speed data transfer but requires a persistent
TCP connection. A network error or a disconnection would be interpreted
as the client program closing and reported as such to subscribers.
10. Dynamic resource provisioning, failover and risk analysis
KM3NeT detectors are expected to operate for at least 10 years. During
such timespan, TriDAS servers will be added and upgraded. Some servers
will fail and will be replaced with newer ones. Adding, removing and replac-
ing machines should be made easy to help system administrators, who may
also change. The importance of maximising the livetime of the detector has
already been emphasized. It is worth noticing that it is not only a matter
of high percentages of integrated active time, but that even a few consecu-
tive hours of downtime would prevent the observation of rare astrophysical
transient events such as supernova neutrino bursts. In this respect, whenever
the detector and shore station have enough resources to run, they should be
running, even if not at 100% performance level. This is even more relevant
if all powerful servers, which should host ODFs, are in service and just a CU
machine has failed. For example, if the machine that hosts the TM fails,
the acquisition does not even start, while all the real computing power is
there just waiting for a command. A failure analysis has been performed to
review the impacts of different failures and assess the corresponding service
losses. Conservatively, the mean time between failures of hardware can be
28
estimated to be of the order of five years, but services may be down because
of software upgrades, which happens several times in a year and is largely
the most common cause of temporary operation interruption, although for
short time intervals, of the order of 10 minutes. The analysis is not limited
to the CU but also includes the parts of the TriDAS that directly depend on
the CU and considers failures caused by one or two concurrent events.
First condi-
tion
Second condi-
tion
Loss of service Impact on
data loss
LAP down N/A GUI inaccessible LOW
MCP down N/A Current run
does not end
LOW
DBI down N/A Datalog + TOA
upload pause
LOW
DM down N/A Missing datalogs MEDIUM
TM down N/A None LOW
DM down Run switch Data loss (run
number lag),
missing datalogs
HIGH
TM down Run switch Data loss (run
number not set),
missing datalogs
HIGH
OADQ server
down
N/A Partial data loss HIGH
OADQ server
down
Only available
server
Total data loss HIGH
ODF server
down
N/A Partial or total
data loss
HIGH
ODF server
down
Only available
server
Total data loss HIGH
ADF server
down
Only available
server
Total data loss HIGH
Table 2: Single-condition and double-condition failure schemes.
As shown in Table 2, disentangling different functions and putting them
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in different programs has already a positive impact on data taking stability,
because the first five rows have low or medium severity. Indeed, it is common
to upgrade the system during an ongoing run, shutting down services and
restarting them one by one. Nevertheless, there are still other high severity
scenarios due to multiple failures at the same time. A redundancy in all CU
program instances can be introduced by having the same CU service running
in multiple machines. This can be obtained with the “Dynamic Resource
Provisioning and Failover” mode:
• The list of machines and services is not defined in the database but it is
maintained by the LAP, and continuously logged to the database. This
is a natural extension of the basic LAP function of recording users and
services.
• For each CU service there are at least two installations, but only one
is running while the others are kept in standing by.
• When running in Dynamic Resource Provisioning mode, every CU ma-
chine runs a LAP that hosts a Health Checker sub-service to perform
basic tests. If a Health Checker determines that tests are not passed, it
causes the automatic shutdown of the services that are locally hosted:
one must avoid that there are conflicting managers, for example two
DMs at the same time, one connected to the MCP and the other dis-
connected.
• LAPs poll the Health Checker service to get the status of the machine.
A Health Checker answers the status polls that are issued regularly
(e.g. 0.1 Hz) in normal conditions. If a machine crashes or fails, its
Health Checker does not answer. If the Health Checker answers that
the tests are not passed, the machine is not considered suitable to work
as if it were failed. The Health Checker itself may fail, but given the
fact that the code it runs is very simple, it can be assumed that there
is a good (hardware) reason for its failure rather than a bug escaping
the pre-deployment testing.
• LAPs may reallocate CU services. When they decide to do so, they
direct the MCP to switch to another run and the (new) DM and (new)
TM to reshape the detector definition and start a new one.
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• LAPs may reallocate TriDAS computing power. When they decide to
do so, they direct the MCP to switch to another run and the DM and
TM to reshape the detector definition and start a new one.
• There is no central authority among LAPs. They synchronize their
status continuously and services that must exist in single instances
are automatically assigned to the available machine with the lowest IP
address. Agreement is therefore not imposed by an authority that may
itself run on a failed machine, but relies on algorithmic consistency.
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TM,DQ
Figure 12: Two configurations of the CU software stack. Left: minimal installation as
used in testing stations without fault tolerance. Right: single fault-tolerant installation, as
should be used in shore stations. Greyed areas show the services that are installed but kept
standing by waiting to take over in case of failures.
In this approach, also TriDAS resources are recorded and managed in
LAPs, which become a redundant set of local resource managers. The de-
tector definition that MCPs, DMs and TMs get is the current one, i.e. one
of all the configurations that are possible with the available resources. In
logical compliance to this, at run start, the DM and TM record in datalogs
the definition of detector that they are using for that run. A detector change
always triggers a run change. Figures 12 and 13 show the full CU stack in
various configurations.
The number of Data Queues and Optical Data Filters may change with
different processing configurations if computing machines fail. However, it
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Figure 13: Double fault-tolerant installation: up to two machines may fail at the same
time without stopping acquisition, triggering and storage.
is considered better to run with reduced resources than not running at all.
Conversely, in this scenario the addition or replacement of a server is done
by just registering the machine change on one of the LAP. It will then prop-
agate the information to others and a detector change will soon allow the
newly acquired computing power to enter data taking. Switching from one
configuration to another should take place in less than 10 seconds, which is
compatible with the duration of most astrophysical transient phenomena.
11. Summary and conclusions
The Control Unit of the KM3NeT data acquisition is a system built of
several components that work together with the common goals of maximising
the live-time and data quality of the operated detectors, both in the deep sea
as well as in component testing / qualification stations. Modularity helps
achieving the target of reliability, because several parts of the Control Unit
are able to continue their activity despite the temporary unavailability of
others. The architecture used, based on the HTTP protocol for interpro-
cess communications, ensures maximum openness of data and algorithms.
Graphical user interfaces are provided through common Web technologies.
It is possible to access the inner status of Control Unit programs by means
of any Web browser. Scalability is guaranteed by performance optimisation
and careful design choices. Tests indicate that a single common server with
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32 cores and 32 GB RAM can control a full detector made of two build-
ing blocks, with a total of 230 Detection Units. Although the Control Unit
continuously reads and writes data to the remote authoritative database
of KM3NeT, possible Internet downtimes are handled without interrupting
the detector operations thanks to a dedicated caching system. As the Con-
trol Unit is usually accessed through private networks, safety practices are
mostly focussed on avoiding mistakes that might affect data quality or de-
tector functionality. In order to achieve that, the Control Unit implements a
complete system of privileges for specific operator categories, integrated with
the central database. To simplify the administration of the DAQ system and
enhance fault tolerance, a Dynamic Resource Provisioning and Failover tech-
nology has been developed. It enables the Control Unit to cope even with
hardware failures of the hosting servers: all the software services of either the
Control Unit and the Trigger and Data Acquisition System can be automat-
ically restarted on different machines, exploiting all the available computing
resources coherently to the prefixed redundancy plan. The Control Unit is
currently in service in more than ten sites, including the two shore stations
for the ARCA and ORCA KM3NeT detectors in the Mediterranean Sea and
various integration and testing stations. The project benefits of the increas-
ing experience on the detector operations and on the continuous feedbacks
from the users. This strategy allows for increasing the operational reliability
of the Control Unit and provides with widespread knowledge for the lifetime
of the KM3NeT scientific program.
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Appendix
Acronym Meaning
ADF Acoustic Data Filter
AJAX Asynchronous JavaScript and XML
CLB Central Logic Board
CSS Cascading Style Sheets
CU Control Unit
CPU Central Processing Unit
DAQ Data Acquisition
DBI Data Base Interface
DM Detector Manager
DML Data Management Language
DOM Digital Optical Module
DQ Data Queue
DU Detection Unit
DW Data Writer
GUI Graphical User Interface
HTML Hypertext Markup Language
HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol
HTTPS Hypertext Transfer Protocol - Se-
cure
JIT Just in time
JSON JavaScript Object Notation
LAP Local Authentication Provider
MCP Master Control Program
ODF Optical Data Filter
PMT Photomultiplier Tube
SQL Structured Query Language
SRP Simple Retransmission Protocol
TCP Transmission Control Protocol
TOA Time of arrival
TM TriDAS Manager
TriDAS Trigger and Data Acquisition Sys-
tem
UDP User Datagram Protocol
URL Uniform Resource Locator
VPN Virtual Private Network
XML Extensible Markup Language35
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